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  • br The PBF is a

    2018-11-07


    The PBF is a conditional cash transfer program officially launched by the Brazilian federal government in 2004. It consisted of a merger of several existing social programs, such as the cooking gas subsidy, the National School Allowance Program, the Food Card Program, the Food Allowance Program, and the Child Labor Eradication Program. In this 4EGI-1 section, the description of the PBF relates to 2006 because the data used in this study were obtained from the 2006 PNAD (Brazilian national household survey). In that year, the supplement of the survey collected information about the conditional cash transfer programs. In order to qualify for the R$15.00 variable cash transfer, households needed to meet the following requirements: The effects on labor supply of programs similar to the PBF have been addressed by comprehensive studies, chiefly in the United States and in the United Kingdom (e.g., Moffitt, 1992; Blundell and Macurdy, 1999; Eissa et al., 2006). There are a sizeable number of empirical studies focusing on disincentives to labor force participation due to conditional cash transfer programs adopted by developing countries. However, the findings are not conclusive. For instance, Parker and Skoufias (2000) and Skoufias and di Maro (2006) investigated the Mexican program Oportunidades and did not find disincentives to contributing to the labor supply among adult workers. Likewise, Edmonds and Schady (2008) also suggest that Ecuador\'s Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) program did not produce effects on the rate of participation of adult individuals in the labor market. On the other side of the spectrum, Maluccio and Flores (2005) showed that Nicaragua\'s Red de Protección Social (RPS) program significantly reduced hours worked among adult male workers, but not among adult female workers. Recently, several studies have sought to determine the effects of the PBF and other conditional cash transfer programs on adult labor supply in Brazil (e.g., Soares et al., 2007; Ferro and Nicollela, 2007; Tavares, 2008; Teixeira, 2008; Covre et al., 2008; Foguel and de Barros, 2008). In general, these analyses on the adverse incentives related to conditional cash transfer programs have also led to distinct conclusions. These studies use different empirical strategies to compare all beneficiaries against observationally similar non-beneficiaries. The program has a set of incentives that can affect the adult labor supply in opposing directions. On one hand, the income transfer may lead to a decrease in labor supply if leisure is a normal good. On the other hand, the conditionalities related to the time allocation of children and adolescents may change adult time allocation, which may increase pollen grains group\'s labor supply. Thus far, the empirical studies estimate the net effect of these different channels.
    Dataset and sample selection In order to obtain the value exclusively comprised of PBF transfers, based on the V1273 variable, we use the filtering procedure shown 4EGI-1 in Fig. 1. This model closely follows the procedure used by de Barros et al. (2007c). We use different samples of individuals and classify them into two groups to check for heterogeneities in the income manipulation tests: Based on the household profile, in order to capture the possible heterogeneous effects of the PBF on labor supply, the subsamples were stratified into another two groups: We perform our empirical analysis separately for each demographic group. The descriptive statistics of the samples are presented in Table 1. In Table 1, the descriptive statistics for family groups “1” and “2” are presented together, as well as separately. Within a group, the statistics are presented separately for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The average monthly per capita household income of PBF beneficiaries, discounted from the cash transfer values for the whole sample, is quite close to the eligibility criterion (R$120.00). For family group “1,” the average monthly per capita household income is slightly greater (1.2%) than the cutoff point, whereas for family group “2,” that figure is 7.6% lower than the cutoff point.