We speculate that viewing of contemplative architectures

We speculate that histone acetyltransferase viewing of contemplative architectures may weaken the ‘narrative self’ (also referred to as intrinsic network, self-reference, or ‘Me’) while strengthening the ‘phenomenal self’ (often labeled as extrinsic network, present moment, or ‘I’) (Farb et al., 2007; Tagini and Raffone, 2010), an outcome that epitomizes successful “contemplation” (Fasching, 2008). This underscores the benefits of EX-I methods when compared to IN-I meditative practices, which must tease out self-referential processes. Not surprisingly, the competence in disengaging one operation but not the other has been determined to be a sign of meditative expertise (Wang et al., 2011). Our findings therefore suggest that EX-I methods might facilitate an effortless entry into the contemplative state. Intense extrinsic attractions or demands inhibit self-referential processes and their neural correlates (Dietrich, 2006; Goldberg et al., 2006), as indicated by numerous visualization and body-based IN-I meditation approaches (Lou et al., 2005; Tang et al., 2009). The overriding of the narrative self and related mechanisms in order to experience extraordinary external conditions is also a defining characteristic of “peak” or “Flow” experiences. Actually, EX-I meditative states are consistent with several of the 9 conditions defining ‘Flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), including sensory-motor focus, reduced self-consciousness, increased absorption, and effortlessness. The fact that ‘Flow’ states have been hypothesized to operate under transient hypo-frontality (Dietrich, 2004), is also consistent with the observed down-regulation of the PFC during EX-I, reaffirming that contemplative states, however induced, are selfless experiences. Recent clinical and neuroscience studies have explored the convergences among meditative, aesthetic, spiritual and even psychedelic states (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012; d’Aquili and Newberg, 2000; Dietrich, 2003; Keltner and Haidt, 2003), but have disagreements on many outstanding issues including definitions and taxonomies, legal and ethical constraints, paucity of experimental evidence, methodological challenges, and bias in contemporary aesthetics (Danto et al., 1998; Elkins, 2001; Nehamas, 2007). By providing preliminary empirical evidence documenting supporting the dynamic relationships among contemplation, beauty, and spirituality, the present study contributes to this emerging convergence. In addition, it provides potentially intriguing insight into the neural correlates of religious (or spiritual) traditions that emphasize the transcendence of the self that has been associated with profound religious experiences (James, 2004).
Conclusions Our pilot study suggests that architects presented with images of ordinary vs. contemplative buildings, arrived at significantly different phenomenological states with distinct neural correlates that find parallels in the differences between meditative and ordinary mental states. Second, despite the similarities to IN-I meditative states (e.g., present-centeredness, high and sustained attention, relaxation, decreased internal dialogue, etc.), architecturally induced contemplation appears to display important differences, such as the high activation of cortical zones dedicated to external input, including sensory-motor, integrative, and embodiment areas — regions usually disengaged under IN-I contemplative states. The fact that EX-I states are distinctly characterized by their recruitment of such brain regions provides empirical support for insights derived from Merleau-Ponty׳s phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty, 1962), current research on embodied cognition (Damasio, 1994; Gallese, 2005; Johnson, 2007) and its relation to architecture (Mallgrave, 2015), bodily self-consciousness (Blanke et al., 2015) and studies of IN-I meditation based on visualization or somatic methods (King and Brownstone, 1999; Kozhevnikov et al., 2009; Lou et al., 2005; Tang et al., 2009). The subjects were easily (i.e., effortlessly) attracted to the buildings in the Experimental block, which might have been associated with decreased dependence on self-regulation and executive attention to maintain the experiential state compared to what is typically reported under IN-I meditation. These findings are further congruent with observations that restorative environments are capable of returning cognitive and affective normalcy from stress, dissonance or fatigue (Kaplan, 1995, 2001; Ulrich et al., 1991). The reliance of EX-I contemplation on the quality of the stimulus highlights both the importance of how the stimulus is conceived, made and deployed but also provides empirical evidence suggesting that EX-I contemplative states might be considered as aesthetic experiences.